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EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION IN TELEHEALTH REGULATION 
by: George Horvath* 
A frequently repeated adage, attributed to a wide range of authors and orators, holds that 
a serious crisis should never be allowed to go to waste.1 The moment in which we find ourselves 
renders this adage particularly timely. Responses to one of the defining crises of our age—the 
COVID–19 pandemic—have mostly been reactive. This includes the responses of multiple actors 
involved with telehealth. Congress, federal regulators, state legislatures, state regulators, private 
insurers, and health care providers, confronting the challenges of the pandemic, have responded 
by making ad hoc adjustments to the regulation and use of telehealth. Moving the conversation 
beyond this reactive posture, Professor Deborah Farringer’s article, A Telehealth Explosion: 
Using Lessons from the Pandemic to Shape the Future of Telehealth Regulation, surveys the 
history of telehealth regulation, the pandemic-era adjustments, and recent proposals for the future 
finds an opportunity instead. The article seeks to put a crisis to good use—taking “advantage of 
the momentum that the COVID–19 public health emergency has created”—to inform the 
creation of “a comprehensive and integrative approach” to telehealth regulation.2 
 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V9.Arg.3 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. J.D. University of California, Berkeley, School of 
Law. M.D. Temple University School of Medicine. I am grateful for the superb editorial work of Erin Elms and the 
Texas A&M Law Review staff. 
 
1 Rahm Emanuel, Opinion, Let’s Make Sure This Crisis Doesn’t Go to Waste, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/25/lets-make-sure-this-crisis-doesnt-go-waste/ 
[https://perma.cc/9DK4-PUBL] (quoting himself from 2008 and stating “[n]ever allow a good crisis to go to 
waste”); Myron F. Weiner, Don’t Waste a Crisis—Your Patient’s or Your Own, 5 MED. ECON. 227 (1976) (stating 
“[i]f you have a . . . crisis in your own life, whatever you do, don’t waste it.”); see THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN 
PROVERBS 60 (Charles C. Doyle et al. eds., 2012) (stating the terms “[a] crisis is an opportunity” and “[d]on’t waste 
a crisis” have roots in the New Testament and Chinese proverbs); e.g., Quotes by Winston Churchill, THE BEST 
QUOTATIONS, https://best-quotations.com/authquotes.php?auth=15 [https://perma.cc/AD79-QAED] (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2021) (stating “[n]ever let a good crisis go to waste”). 
2 Deborah R. Farringer, A Telehealth Explosion: Using Lessons from the Pandemic to Shape the Future of 
Telehealth Regulation, 9 TEXAS A&M L. REV. 1, 30 (2021). 
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I find it possible to read A Telehealth Explosion in two ways: as an article with narrow 
aims and as an article with much broader aims. Parts I and II present these two readings. In Part 
III, I situate the broader reading within the context of earlier expansions of federal regulation of 
the health care enterprise to pose the question of how likely it is that the current crisis can be put 
to the good use that Professor Farringer seeks. 
I. A NARROW READING 
In one possible reading, A Telehealth Explosion is an important but self-limited 
contribution to a growing body of scholarly work focused on telehealth regulation.3 A Telehealth 
Explosion expressly disclaims a desire to offer specific proposals, instead urging that the path 
forward be data-driven and guided by five “key factors” that regulators and legislators should 
consider as they craft a new regulatory regime.4 The article might be interpreted as falling within 
a genre of scholarship in which an author painstakingly identifies a major problem but eschews 
the work of fashioning a set of specific responses in favor of setting out a framework for others’ 
use. 
Reading A Telehealth Explosion in this way, one particular concern is the limited focus 
on the quality of care that telehealth can provide. Admittedly, Professor Farringer highlights the 
importance of quality to state regulators, members of Congress, and the telehealth industry,5 and 
in one key factor urges state legislators and regulators to analyze emerging data “to understand 
where telehealth might actually generate quality of care concerns.”6 But in other places, concerns 
 
3 See, e.g., Laura C. Hoffman, Shedding Light on Telemedicine & Online Prescribing: The Need to Balance Access 
to Health Care and Quality of Care, 46 AM. J.L. & MED. 237 (2020); David A. Hoffman, Increasing Access to 
Care: Telehealth During COVID–19, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1 (2020); Mei Wa Kwong, Telehealth and Public 
Programs - Evolution of Telehealth Policy in Medicare and Medicaid, 15 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 7 (2019). 
4 Farringer, supra note 2, at 39. 
5 Id. at 8-9, 35-37. 
6 Id. at 44. 





about quality appear to go unrecognized. One example is in the discussion of whether 
requirements for an in-person evaluation, before care is delivered remotely, should be 
eliminated. The article states that “from a medical perspective” the reasons for requiring an 
initial in-person visit are to allow for “(1) verifying and authenticating the patient, (2) disclosing 
physician identity and credentials, and (3) obtaining necessary consents.”7 In considering 
whether to eliminate these requirements, regulators should balance these concerns against the 
restrictions on competition and the availability of medical and pharmacy services that the 
requirements impose.8 But this framing overlooks the critical medical reason for a face-to-face 
encounter from a provider’s perspective: An initial face-to-face visit allows the provider to 
gather clinical information that is difficult if not impossible to obtain remotely. Providers gather 
some of this information from subtle findings on the physical examination, such as the slight 
parasternal heave that may indicate an enlarged ventricle or the slight bobbing of the head 
(DeMusset’s sign) that may indicate severe aortic regurgitation, which even state of the art 
technologies cannot yet replicate remotely. 9 But a great deal of information is also gathered 
from behavioral clues that, in person, can signal discomfort with a topic, unexpressed concerns, 
or a tendency to minimize or dramatize complaints, but that could be missed entirely in an online 
encounter. An initial visit helps a clinician establish a broad and deep understanding of each 
patient, which can inform later remote follow-up evaluations. In some contexts, the quality of 
care afforded by an initial in-person evaluation must be weighed alongside the other concerns. 
 
7 Id. at 10 & n.61 (quoting a discussion of when a provider-patient relationship is established as contained in a report 
by the Federation of State Medical Boards). 
8 Id. at 38. 
9 Jonathan Abrams, Physical Examination of the Heart and Circulation, in ESSENTIAL CARDIOLOGY: PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE 99, 102 tbl.3, 112 (Clive Rosendorff ed., 2d ed. 2006). 
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The discussion of the five key factors also reflects a limited focus on quality. Quality 
features prominently only in one of the factors: “State laws should be for the purpose of 
promoting efficiency and quality care, not protecting against new competitors.”10 Even here, the 
framing emphasizes what regulation should not be (a cartelization of services) rather than how 
regulators should think about ensuring the quality of care. My point is that quality is a crucial 
factor that legislators and regulators must consider. The regulatory environment that existed 
before the pandemic limited the development of telehealth and, concomitantly, the development 
of clinical data on the outcomes that are achieved when care is delivered remotely.11 This data 
will eventually emerge in piecemeal fashion as clinicians study the quality and value of 
telehealth in very specific aspects of practice.12 Moving forward, it is crucial that a 
comprehensive regulatory approach incentivize the generation of such data and ensure that it is 
considered by legislators and regulators every step of the way. 
A second concern focuses on how some of the proposals in A Telehealth Explosion could 
be accomplished. One of the Farringer factors urges state legislators and regulators to eliminate 
barriers to competition and restrictions on services. But state laws and regulations that erect 
barriers and impose restrictions are often deliberate features rather than inadvertent bugs. State 
licensure of physicians, for example, has been supported by physicians in part to limit the 
availability of competing medical services.13 How are such laws and regulations to be eliminated 
 
10 Farringer, supra note 2, at 43-44. 
11 Id. at 2. 
12 Cf. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 241-42 (reviewing research studies examining telehealth and remote prescribing in 
two specific clinical contexts: antibiotics for pediatric respiratory infections and antibiotics for adult respiratory 
infections). 
13 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 102 (updated ed. 2017) (explaining that 
allopaths sought early state licensing laws to “protect . . . against competition from untrained practitioners”); Aaron 
Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1093, 1107 (2014) (providing examples of how licensure and associated regulations are used to limit 
the availability of medical services). 





when state actors and many of their politically powerful constituents have strong reasons to 
maintain them? 
A broader reading of the article answers this question. If A Telehealth Explosion were 
simply urging the ongoing use of data to inform policy as regulators consider the five Farringer 
factors, the article’s goals might be viewed as relatively modest. Such a reading would, in my 
view, be a mistake. A Telehealth Explosion, more broadly read, packs a much bigger bang. 
Articles that fall within that genre of scholarship referred to above—articles that identify a 
problem and how to think about it without actually doing the nuts-and-bolts work of solving the 
problem—can, if done well and if read by the right audience, define the problem and structure 
the approaches to solving it. These articles can thus determine the possible set of outcomes that 
will emerge. Professor Farringer, drawing on the history of telehealth and telehealth regulation, 
and looking over the lessons learned during the pandemic, is doing just this. 
But it is possible to read A Telehealth Explosion even more broadly, not as a roadmap for 
evolution but rather as a plan for revolutionary change. At the same time that it disclaims the 
desire to offer specific proposals, A Telehealth Explosion offers a number of specifics in the 
service of creating “a comprehensive and integrative approach” to telehealth regulation. And 
these specifics would involve a substantial expansion of federal control. The next Part examines 
this broader reading. 
II. A BROADER READING 
Telehealth is subjected to a polycentric set of regulatory inputs. As Professor Farringer 
summarizes, regulation before the pandemic subjected telehealth to 
an intricate and sometimes conflicting regulatory structure involving state laws 
and regulations in the domicile state, state laws and regulations in other states, 
federal laws and regulations, federal reimbursement rules, state reimbursement 
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rules, and all applicable laws, regulations, and contractual provisions of 
commercial insurers.14 
 
And as Part III of the article demonstrates, the federal and state responses to the 
pandemic, including the waivers that several federal agencies have granted, have done little to 
cut through this Gordian knot of conflicting statutes and regulations. Not surprisingly, then, the 
first key factor—really a set of concrete proposals—that Professor Farringer articulates is that it 
is “imperative for the federal government and states to work together to create a regulatory 
regime that is less complex and less confusing.”15 But how is this to be done? After all, the states 
remain motivated, among other things, to erect barriers to entry by out-of-state providers and 
pharmacies.  
The answer toward which A Telehealth Explosion appears to turn is substantially to 
centralize telehealth regulation under the federal government, notably the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS). I have noted how an article like A Telehealth Explosion can 
determine the direction and even the outcome of attempts to solve difficult problems by setting 
the terms of engagement. Professor Farringer’s first key factor uses this concept, arguing that 
“Congress, in coordination with HHS, should establish a definitional framework for telehealth 
services.”16 Doing so would “ensure that the states and federal government are operating off the 
same general terms and from the same general premise.”17 The federal government would thus 
set the terms, the structure, the rules, and the objectives for telehealth regulation. One intended 
result is that the “states will be better able to engage in legislative redesign that creates 
 
14 Farringer, supra note 2, at 39. 
15 Id. at 40. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 





consistency between the state and federal governments and among the states.”18 With Congress 
and HHS setting the terms, this state-level redesign would create consistency with federally 
established terms and objectives. 
Further support that A Telehealth Explosion sees centralizing telehealth regulation under 
the federal government as the best way forward is found in the suggestion that the federal 
government “create incentives that would encourage states to coordinate with one another and 
with the federal government on a basic regulatory structure for telehealth.”19 How the federal 
government would do this is not elaborated, but the suggestion seems to encompass the 
possibility of a grant program in which Congress would make substantial funding available to 
states that adopt the HHS framework. This kind of grant program could help convert the seeming 
precatory language that state actors evaluate the effect of state laws and regulations into 
something with more bite.20 
The need for the federal government to play a dominant role in a “comprehensive and 
integrative approach” to telehealth regulation also arises from the current regulatory regime, the 
deficiencies of which the remaining Farringer factors address. The second key factor is the 
necessity of “reducing the controls at the state and federal levels that continue to tie telehealth 
services to a physical location.”21 This would include permitting the delivery of virtual services 
to a patient’s home, allowing for the delivery of care across state lines, and eliminating the 




20 Congress’s power to incentivize state conduct is expansive: Congress can induce states to take actions by 
conditioning the receipt of funds even though directly requiring those same actions exceeds Congress’s Article I 
authority. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012). This power is not unlimited; in Chief 
Justice Roberts’s phrasing, Congress cannot create incentives that are so powerful as to amount to “a gun to the 
head.” Id. at 80. 
21 Farringer, supra note 2, at 41. 
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Success would also depend on correcting reimbursement disparities, which is the subject of the 
fifth key factor. Although some of these steps are within the states’ authority, the states’ power to 
make significant change “is largely limited to either Medicaid or commercial insurance for 
residents of the state.”22 In fact, the states almost certainly lack the authority to untether virtual 
care from specific locations and require payment parity of telehealth services for half of their 
residents.23 Thus, a robust federal regulatory role is necessary to achieve the goal of expanding 
access. And the final key factor—examining whether laws and regulations established to protect 
against “fraud, waste, and abuse[,] are… successfully controlling such ills or [are] instead 
creating needless obstacles [to] innovation”24—is under federal control already: These obstacles 
are created by fraud and abuse statutes and regulations that apply to Medicare.  
Thus, under a broad reading of A Telehealth Explosion, achieving its aspiration of 
fostering “a comprehensive and integrative approach” to telehealth regulation will only be 
possible by creating a federally based regulatory regime. Given the incentives for states to 
behave in a self-interested fashion and the fact that individual states are not capable of resolving 
many of the problems in telehealth regulation, this would appear to be an appropriate area for 
federal regulation. Of course, any such move toward centralization raises a host of concerns over 
 
22 Id. at 41 & n.251. 
23 According to recent Census Bureau data, 17.8% of people are covered by Medicaid. KATHERINE KEISLER-
STARKEY & LISA N. BUNCH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2020, 
at 4 tbl.1 (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2021/demo/p60-274.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/82TR-QAH9]. Directly purchased plans cover 10.5%. Id. The state’s authority to regulate 
commercial insurance is sharply limited by the preemption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA), which has interpreted to bar state regulation of self-funded employer sponsored health insurance. Erin 
C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Federalism, ERISA, and State Single-Payer Health Care, 168 U. PA. L. 
REV. 389, 428-30 (2020). As a result, states may only regulate fully funded employer sponsored plans, which 
account for 39% of all employer sponsored plans. Id. The Census Bureau reported that 54.4% of people were 
covered by an employer sponsored plan. KEISLER-STARKEY & BUNCH, supra note 23, at 4 tbl.1. Thus, states can 
regulate the coverage of 21.3% of people. In total, states can regulate the coverage of 49.6% of people. 
24 Farringer, supra note 2, at 42. 





federalism and the already eroded tradition of state primacy in regulating health care.25 I wish to 
avoid these concerns and instead seek to answer a question: Is Professor Farringer’s proposal 
likely to succeed?  
III. SITUATING THE BROAD READING WITHIN MODELS OF CHANGE 
Change—even revolutionary change—is more likely to succeed if it follows a path that 
has yielded success in the past. In asking whether a proposal for an expanded federal role in 
telehealth regulation is likely to succeed, a comparison to three different paths, or models, that 
earlier expansions of federal regulation in health care have employed may be instructive. Before 
proceeding, it is necessary to state a few assumptions: that the proposal’s goal is the creation of a 
federal-based regulatory regime, that demand for telehealth will remain strong, and that 
telehealth will represent a large portion of health care delivery from this point on.26 Under these 
assumptions, a comprehensive approach will necessitate a large federal presence. It is also 
necessary to admit that many of the historical antecedents to which we might turn for insights are 
uneasy fits. The 20th century saw several dramatic expansions of federal authority over medical 
products—biologics, drugs, and medical devices. And from the mid-twentieth century to the 
present, we have seen expansions of the federal government’s role in regulating and providing 
health care insurance. Although telehealth regulation involves products and insurance,  
A Telehealth Explosion is really discussing the regulation of a mode of delivery of health care 
services that is facilitated by new technologies. Recognizing this, I argue that the approach that 
 
25 See Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 454 (2015) 
(describing the role of federal regulation over many areas of medicine). 
26 The assumptions concerning the future demand for and the portion of delivery that will be supplied by telehealth 
seem reasonable. Before the pandemic, telehealth was the fastest growing mode of health care delivery and 
projected to account for $64 billion in annual health care spending by 2025. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 237-38. More 
recent projections have gone as high as $250 billion annually, although these have subsequently been the subject of 
cautions. Oleg Bestsennyy et al., Telehealth: A Quarter-Trillion-Dollar Post-COVID19 Reality?, MCKINSEY & CO., 
(July 19, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/telehealth-a-
quarter-trillion-dollar-post-covid-19-reality [https://perma.cc/N2NZ-R9RQ]. 
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Congress and HHS took in regulating electronic health information in the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides the most 
relevant model for comparison. 
In one model of expanding the federal role in regulating aspects of health care, Congress 
has responded to highly publicized tragedies by defining an entire category of products, over 
which a federal agency will be given jurisdiction, and establishing a detailed statutory regime to 
be implemented by that agency. Early in the twentieth century, Congress rushed the Biologics 
Control Act into law after highly publicized episodes in which contaminated batches of the 
smallpox vaccine and diphtheria antitoxin killed scores of people.27 Congress passed the original 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938, shortly after the Elixer Sulfanilamide event in 
which more than a hundred people, mostly children, died from the toxic effects of a never-tested 
solvent used to dissolve a sulfa drug.28 And Congress passed the Medical Device Amendments in 
1976 in the wake of high-profile device problems such as the sepsis, spontaneous abortions, and 
maternal deaths caused by the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.29 
Superficially, the COVID–19 crisis, with over 822,000 deaths in the United States to 
date,30 would seem to provide a close analogy. But each of the earlier instances differs from the 
COVID–19 crisis in a critical way: In response to the earlier crises, Congress responded by 
regulating the cause of the crisis (contaminated vaccines, untested drugs, defective devices), 
whereas regulating telehealth does not involve regulating the cause of the crisis (the SARS-CoV-
 
27 Terry S. Coleman, Early Developments in the Regulation of Biologics, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 544, 545-51 (2016). 
28 JAMES H. YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PATENT MEDICINES IN AMERICA 
BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 205 (2016); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of 
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1761(1996). 
29 Jordan Paradise et al., Evaluating Oversight of Human Drugs and Medical Devices: A Case Study of the FDA and 
Implications for Nanobiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 598, 614 (2009). 
30 Coronavirus Resource Center, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED.,  https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/ 
[https://perma.cc/E5K5-3TK6]. 





2 virus). The direct relationship between the harm-causing agent and the regulatory response, 
which might break through legislative logjams, is not present.  
In another model of federal expansion, in response to decades-long efforts to expand 
health care coverage, Congress created sources of funding and an extensive administrative 
bureaucracy to administer the Medicare and Medicaid programs and various aspects of the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).31 It is difficult to argue that telehealth presents the same kind of 
long-term pent-up demand that preceded the creation of federal health care coverage for the 
elderly through Medicare or the expansions to coverage through the ACA. 
Thus, the social conditions that these models have been used to address are not close 
matches to those that are present in this moment. Nor are these the models that A Telehealth 
Explosion is employing. Creating a detailed statutory regime akin to those in the Biologics 
Control Act, the FDCA, and the Medical Device Amendments is not the model that Professor 
Farringer is following. And although I read A Telehealth Explosion to advocate a strongly 
federal-centered regulatory approach, creating the equivalent of the Medicare, Medicaid, or ACA 
type program to provide coverage for telehealth services is not the model either.  
Far more relevant is the HIPAA model. By the early 1990s, the promise of a new 
technology—electronic storage and transmission of health records—to improve health care had 
become apparent. At the same time, the dangers of electronically stored records, particularly the 
danger of compromised privacy, had become apparent as well.32 And the existence of a tangled 
web of state-level privacy protections threatened to hamper the development of this promising 
 
31 See generally, THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (2d ed. 2000) (reviewing efforts to expand 
the federal government’s role in health insurance between 1915 and the enactment of Medicare in 1965). 
32 Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic 
Private Health Information, 48 B.C.L. REV. 331, 332-33 (2007) (discussing the persistence of these factors a decade 
later). 
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new component of health care. In response, Congress included in the HIPAA statute a subtitle 
intended  
to improve . . . the health care system, by encouraging the development of a 
health information system through the establishment of standards and 
requirements for the electronic transmission of certain health information.33  
 
The statute included a basic set of definitions establishing who was to be subjected to 
regulation and the object of that regulation, but ultimately left the development of the details to 
HHS. 
Under a broad reading of A Telehealth Explosion, HIPAA provides a reasonable analogy 
to the key proposal for Congress and HHS to “establish a definitional framework for telehealth 
services.”34 Many of the same conditions are present now. Thanks in part to the pandemic, the 
promise of a new technology—telehealth—has now been amply demonstrated. As the examples 
of Zoom bombing have illustrated, the risks of this new technology are also now apparent. And 
the impediment that the existing tangled web of regulations poses to the realization of the 
technology’s full potential is undeniable. In addition, the goal of encouraging the development of 
an exciting new technology is analogous. To be sure, the Privacy Rule has no shortage of 
detractors. But as a model for expanding the federal presence in health care regulation, HIPAA 
has been a success: There is no doubt that the terms, the structure, the rules, and the objectives of 
privacy regulation have been set by Congress and HHS.  
 
33 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, § 261, 110 Stat 1936, 2021 (1996). 
34 Farringer, supra note 2, at 40. 





Another adage that is particularly relevant in the COVID–19 era is that “uncertainty is the 
only certainty.”35 Whether demand for telehealth will remain strong, whether clinical data will 
continue to support its use, and—relevant here—whether Professor Farringer’s approach to the 
regulatory barriers that have stymied the development of telehealth will be adopted all remain 
uncertain. But in the effort to create a solution to a complex problem, adopting a model for 
change that has succeeded in the past is a promising choice.  
 
35 This quote is attributed to mathematician John Allen Paulos. John Allen Paulos’s Quotes, GOODREADS, 
https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/504787-uncertainty-is-the-only-certainty-there-is-and-knowing-how. 
[https://perma.cc/HH9Z-6VJH] (last visited Dec. 29, 2021). As yet, the quote does not appear to have been 
attributed to Winston Churchill. 
